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MANDATORY LABOR ARBITRATION
OF STATUTORY CLAIMS, AND THE
FUTURE OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT:
14 PENN PLAZA V. PYETT
David L. Gregory* & Edward McNamara**
In its sharply divided 5 to 4 decision in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, the
United States Supreme Court endorsed mandatory labor arbitration,
rather than external litigation, to resolve statutory claims of unlawful
age-based employment discrimination brought by labor union-repre-
sented employees. The Court substantially clarified, and perhaps simpli-
fied, what had become an increasingly complex and potentially
inconsistent panorama of decisions on whether labor union-represented
employees can be mandated to arbitrate, and thus be foreclosed from
litigating de novo, statutory claims, most frequently those alleging un-
lawful employment discrimination by the employer. This Article will
critically assess the salient foreseeable consequences and likely ramifi-
cations of the Pyett decision.
On the eve of a half-century of Supreme Court enthusiasm for labor
arbitration, grounded in the landmark Steelworkers Trilogy in 1960, the
Pyett decision perhaps reached the correct result, favoring a single,
globalized, omnibus arbitration rather than second bites at the apple in
serial litigation. However, the Court engaged in deeply problematic and
severely truncated reasoning to reach this result. Unfortunately, Pyett is
not the rare exception. The phenomenon of the Court reaching the cor-
rect result through badly-fractured and spasmodic reasoning, while not
the norm, occurs with some frequency. Pragmatically, a sound func-
tional result from a problematic and jagged opinion is markedly superior
to an elegant theory yielding an obsolete, wrong result.
The great practical utility of these principles is palpable in labor
and employment law. Pyett is certainly not the first, nor will it be the
last, decision of the Court that, while not elegantly grounded in sophisti-
cated jurisprudential metaphysics, may nevertheless work well and yield
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just and fair results for employees, employers, and unions who favor a
single, integrated arbitration forum for the resolution of all contractual
and statutory claims. Meanwhile, those employees, employers, and un-
ions wishing to retain independent judicial recourse for litigating statu-
tory claims are not precluded from doing so and are left unaffected by
the Pyett decision.
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INTRODUCTION
In its sharply divided' 5-4 decision in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett,2 the
United States Supreme Court dramatically endorsed mandatory labor ar-
bitration, rather than external litigation, to resolve statutory claims of un-
I See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1456 (2009). Justice Thomas wrote
the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito.
Justice Souter wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and
Ginsburg. Justice Stevens also authored a separate dissenting opinion.
2 Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1456. Pyen has already been seized upon by the lower courts.
See, e.g., Matthews v. Denver Newspaper Agency, No. 07-CV-02097-WDM-KLM, 2009 WL
1231776, at *5 (D. Colo. May 4, 2009) ("Under the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Pyett,
because the parties recognized that the CBA's arbitration agreement covered Plaintiffs statu-
tory claims, I conclude that Gardner-Denver does not preclude me from finding that Plaintiff
waived his right to seek a judicial remedy by voluntarily pursuing arbitration under the CBA
and that his discrimination claims are now barred by the doctrine of res judicata."). The origi-
nal phrasing ("subsequent decisions") indicated the case was cited by the Supreme Court
subsequently.
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lawful age-based employment discrimination brought by union-
represented employees subject to such a provision in their labor con-
tract.3 The Court summarily isolated and trivialized as jurisprudentially
obsolete, but did not deem it necessary to formally overrule, thirty-five
years of well-established precedent 4 that had protected the employee's
right to litigate de novo statutory claims of unlawful employment dis-
crimination without suffering any res judicata or collateral estoppel ef-
fects from a prior adverse arbitration decision. 5 The Court substantially
clarified, and perhaps simplified, what had become an increasingly com-
plex and potentially inconsistent panorama of decisions as to whether
union-represented employees can be mandated to arbitrate, and thus be
foreclosed from litigating de novo, statutory claims.
With its controversial activist methodology, the political and ideo-
logical Court ran roughshod over stare decisis principles. 6 As a result, a
host of questions, ramifications, and unintended consequences of the Py-
ett decision could transform the dynamics of arbitration well beyond the
present contours of union-represented employment environments.
3 See Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1456.
4 See discussion infra Part IlIl.A; see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Hap-
pened on the Way to the (Alternative) Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in
the Wake of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. REV. 591 (2007); Samuel
Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1344 (1997); Julius Getman, Was Harry Shulman Right?: The Development of Arbitra-
tion in Labor Disputes, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 15 (2007); William B. Gould IV, Kissing
Cousins?: The Federal Arbitration Act and Modern Labor Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609
(2006).
5 Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1456.
6 Cf STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTU-
TION (Knopf 2005) (discussing the need to combine both the liberty of the ancients (active
liberty) with the liberty of the modems and arguing that the courts should interpret constitu-
tional and statutory texts with the Constitution's democratic nature in mind); ORIGINALISM: A
QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi ed., Regnery Pub. 2007) (lobbying for
originalism as the correct way to interpret the Constitution and discussing judges' opinions
regarding the principle of stare decisis); RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (Harvard
University Press 2008) (discussing the various roles of judges, the judicial method, and the
role of precedent as a superior force to which judges yield); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE:
INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT (Doubleday 2007) (revealing the inner-
workings of the Supreme Court and its Justices, including how some justices do not believe in
stare decisis); Frank H. Easterbrook, Pragmatism's Role in Interpretation, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 901 (2008) (arguing that both originalism and pragmatism can play roles in consti-
tutional interpretation); Stephen B. Presser, Judicial Ideology and the Survival of the Rule of
Law: A Field Guide to the Current Political War Over the Judiciary, 39 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 427
(2008) (exploring the idea that judges and courts are to follow the law, not make it); Clifford
W. Taylor, Merit Selection: Choosing Judges Based on Their Politics Under the Veil of a
Disarming Name, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 97 (2009) (describing the dispute between two
potential roles of judges, that of judges functioning solely as interpreters versus judges acting
as policy makers).
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On the eve of a half-century of Supreme Court enthusiasm for labor
arbitration, grounded in the landmark Steelworkers Trilogy7 in 1960, the
Pyett decision perhaps reached the correct result-favoring a single,
globalized, omnibus arbitration rather than second bites at the apple in
serial litigation." However, the Court engaged in deeply problematic and
severely truncated reasoning. Pyett is not the rare exception. The phe-
nomenon of the Court reaching the correct result, but through badly frac-
tured and spasmodic reasoning, while not the norm, occurs with some
frequency. 9 Pragmatically however, a sound functional result from a
problematic and jagged opinion is markedly superior to an elegant theory
yielding an obsolete and incorrect result.
The great practical utility of these principles is especially true in
labor and employment law. Pyett is certainly not the first, nor will it be
the last decision of the Court that, while not elegantly grounded in so-
phisticated jurisprudential metaphysics, may nevertheless work well and
yield just and fair results' 0 for employees, employers, and unions who
favor a single, integrated arbitration forum for the resolution of all con-
tractual and statutory claims. Meanwhile, those employees, employers,
and unions wishing to retain independent judicial recourse for statutory
claims are not precluded from doing so and are left unaffected by the
Pyett decision. An omnibus mandatory labor arbitration mechanism to
hear all issues, including all statutory claims, must be the deliberate, ne-
gotiated product of the parties, and be unequivocally set forth in the par-
7 See United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); see also Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor
Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain,
64 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 3 (1988); William B. Gould IV, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
Awards-Thirty Years of the Steelworkers Trilogy: The Aftermath of AT&T and Misco, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 464 (1984); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitra-
tion Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1146
(1977).
8 See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1456 (2009).
9 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L. J. 920 (1973) (favoring the result of Roe v. Wade, but deploring its legal reasoning).
10 A certain inelegance is the price readily paid for the democratic experience, and exper-
iment in democracy is very much part of the Brandeisian principle that the states are the
"laboratories" of Jeffersonian democracy. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297
U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla.
Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-76 (1988). So too, the
workplace. See Thomas C. Kohler, Labor Law: "Making Life More Human "-Work and the
Social Question, in RECOVERING SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS: CATHOLIC PERSPECrvES ON AMERI-
CAN LAW 163 (Michael A. Scaperlanda & Teresa Stanton Collett eds., The Catholic University
of America Press 2007). Chicago labor lawyer Thomas Geoghegan contends that the decline
of labor in the workplace has contributed to a rise in litigation, as most workers have no
genuine familiarity with workplace ADR mechanisms, and increasingly see litigation as their
sole recourse. See THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, SEE YOU IN COURT: How THE RIGHT MADE
AMERICA A LAWSUIT NATION (The New Press 2007).
THE FUTURE OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT
ties' collective bargaining agreement. As the Supreme Court ruled in
Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.," the labor contract provi-
sion for mandatory arbitration of all statutory claims must be clear and
unmistakable in order to constitute a waiver of the employees' Gardner-
Denver right to pursue subsequent external litigation of statutory claims.
A general fair employment practices declaration by the parties will be
manifestly insufficient to be considered a Pyett waiver of the employees'
right to litigate separately in court their statutory claims.
This Article will examine Pyett's place among these considerations.
Part I of the Article will present a synoptic chronology of the prior perti-
nent decisions of the Supreme Court. Part II will set forth the Second
Circuit's experience setting the stage for Pyett, while Part III will focus
on the Supreme Court's Pyett decision. Part IV will assess the likely
ramifications of this important decision.
I. FROM GARDNER-DENVER TO CIRCUIT CITY. A BRIEF SYNOPSIS
A. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
In a necessarily chronological, but decidedly less than linear fash-
ion, the Supreme Court has articulated a series of benchmarks bearing on
the "arbitration or litigation" dynamic, commencing with its landmark
unanimous decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver'2 in 1974.13 Alex-
ander was a member of a labor union and was protected by a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA). 14 Through the union, the grievance pro-
11 525 U.S. 70 (1998); see infra Part I.C.
12 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Gardner-Denver and its progeny have spawned significant law
review commentaries. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment
Arbitration at Gilmer's Quinceaftera, 81 TuL. L. REV. 331 (2006); Richard A. Bales & Chris-
topher J. Kippley, Extending OWBPA Notice and Consent Protections to Arbitration Agree-
ments Involving Employees and Consumers, 8 NEV. L.J. 10 (2007); Harry T. Edwards, Where
are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST.
U. L. REv. 293 (1999); Michael Z. Green, Measures to Encourage and Reward Post-Dispute
Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Discrimination Claims, 8 NEV. L.J. 58 (2007); Ann C.
Hodges, Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Unionized Workplace: Is Bargaining with the
Union Required?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. REsOL. 513 (2001); John Kagel, Arbitration and
Due Process: The Way We Were at the Time of Gilmer, 11 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 267
(2007); George Nicolau, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: Its Ramifications and Impli-
cations for Employees, Employers and Practitioners, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177 (1998);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The
Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996); Clyde W. Summers,
Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685 (2004).
13 In the same Term, the Court held that a union could not waive the distribution rights
of employees because they are National Labor Relations Act Section 7 statutory rights. See
NLRB v. Magnavox, 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974); see also Matthew W. Finkin, The Limits of
Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MtNN. L. REV. 183, 189 (1980).
14 See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 39-40.
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testing his discharge was taken to arbitration. 15 The grievance was de-
nied and the discharge sustained. 16 Alexander then filed a lawsuit in
federal district court, alleging that he had been unlawfully discriminated
against on the basis of his race. 17 The employer, Gardner-Denver, un-
successfully argued that the adverse arbitration award had res judicata
effect and thus precluded his subsequent litigation. 18 The Supreme
Court, however, found that Alexander had the right to a de novo trial in
federal district court regarding his statutory claims of alleged unlawful
employment discrimination on the basis of his race. 19 He was not fore-
closed by the prior adverse arbitration decision, which did not have res
judicata effect because "an individual does not forfeit his private cause of
action if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the non-
discrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement."
20
Perhaps the most compelling rationale for preserving the subsequent
external litigation avenue is grounded in the jurisprudential and practical
reality that courts may sometimes be the best and only recourse for em-
ployees. This deep mistrust of "private justice" 21 is reflected in the pop-
ulist, class-based ideology that states that employment relationships are
essentially adhesion contracts, with the dominant, corporate employer
dictating terms to the helpless, subordinated worker.22 To entirely priva-
tize the resolution of disputes through mandatory arbitration, and to fore-
close external litigation, is to ignore Justice Douglas' fundamental truth
that "[t]he loss of the proper judicial forum carries with it the loss of
substantial rights." 2
3
15 Id. at 36.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 36 (1974).
19 Id. at 43-44.
20 Id. at 49.
21 There is a voluminous and rich literature deeply critical of.the privatized justice of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, especially when the courts are marginalized in the rush to
ADR. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-87 (1984); Sympo-
sium, Against Settlement Twenty-five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1117 (2009). Of
course, ADR is here to stay. See David L. Gregory & Francis A. Cavanagh, Transatlantic
Perspectives on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 2 (2007).
22 This bleak, Great Depression-era scenario is encapsulated in the opening policy provi-
sion of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006), enacted in 1935 to bring
some rough equilibrium to this markedly skewed reality. Many contemporary critics of the
Act, including many labor leaders, assert that the highly politicized NLRB has, since the end
of the Carter administration, fundamentally failed. See, e.g., WILLIAM GOULD IV, LABORED
RELATIONS (The MIT Press 2000) (providing scathing criticisms of Board politics and interne-
cine warfare by the Clinton administration NLRB Chairman); David L. Gregory, 2 EMPLOY-
MErr RIGHTs QUARTERLY 74-75 (2001) (reviewing GoULD, supra); see also David L.
Gregory, The Long View of the NLRA at 70... Or, the More Things Change??, 56 LAB. L. J.
172(2005).
23 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 532 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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The NLRB, however, has largely acquiesced to the consolidation of
virtually all authority in the hands of private labor arbitrators, including
resolution of Section 8 unfair labor practice claims.24 Thus, the leap
from Gardner-Denver to Pyett is not as dramatic or unprecedented as
those championing Gardner-Denver's retention would assert.
B. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
In 1991, the Supreme Court, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., held that a nonunionized white-collar worker in the financial ser-
vices sector was bound by the terms of the mandatory arbitration agree-
ment he had executed at the commencement of employment. 25 Thus, he
was precluded from subsequently litigating in court his allegation that his
employment was terminated for, inter alia, unlawful age discrimination
in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967.26 Gilmer quickly became the alternative to Gardner-Denver-the
alternative endorsed in Pyett.
C. Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.
In 1998, in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., the Su-
preme Court declined to break the one-to-one tie between Gardner-Den-
ver and Gilmer.27  Justice Scalia, castigating the indiscriminate
boilerplate language of the arbitration provision in the CBA at issue,
found that the absence of careful contouring obviously could not pre-
clude the plaintiff, Mr. Wright, from pursuing in court his claims regard-
ing his employer's bad-faith interference with his insurance and medical
benefits for his bad back.
28
Wright was injured while working as a longshoreman.29 He sought
workers' compensation for permanent disability, settled his claim, and
received social security disability benefits. 30 A few years later, Wright
again sought employment at the dock with various stevedoring compa-
24 See United Tech. Corp., 268 NLRB 557, 559 (1984) ("Where an employer and a union
have voluntarily elected to create dispute resolution machinery culminating in final and bind-
ing arbitration, it is contrary to the basic principles of the [National Labor Relations] Act for
the Board to jump into the fray prior to an honest attempt by the parties to resolve their
disputes through that machinery."). This reiterates the NLRB doctrines in Spielberg Mfg. Co.
112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), and Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971), which es-
sentially transfer the power to resolve NLRA Section 8 unfair labor practices claims from the
NLRB to private labor arbitrators.
25 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 20 (1991)
26 See id.
27 See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv, Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 77 (1998).
28 See id. at 82.
29 See id. at 74.
30 See id.
20101
436 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19:429
nies. 31 He was hired and worked until the companies found out about his
workers' compensation claim.32 The companies refused to allow him to
work, claiming he was "unqualified" due to his disability, despite the fact
that he had been performing his duties adequately.33 Pursuant to his
union's advice, Wright filed charges with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC), alleging violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), ignoring an all-encompassing arbitration provi-
sion in the applicable CBA.
34
Justice Scalia and the majority distinguished Wright from both Gil-
mer and Gardner-Denver. First, the Court noted that the presumption of
arbitrability it had previously expressed in the Steelworkers Trilogy
should "not extend beyond the reach of the principal rationale that justi-
fies it, i.e., that arbitrators are in a better position than courts to interpret
the terms of a CBA. '' 35 Here, however, the CBA only called for arbitra-
tion of all disputes in general, and the federal court system was deemed
better suited for a claim under the ADA.
36
Next, the Court found that "the right to a federal judicial forum is of
sufficient importance to be protected against less-than-explicit union
waiver in a CBA. '' 37 If such a waiver of rights is to be upheld, the
waiver must be stated in "clear and unmistakable" language. 38 This
stringent requirement necessary to find effective waiver of individual
statutory claims was not met here.39 Consequently, the Court had no
need to discuss whether an explicit union waiver would have been up-
held.40 The decision in Gilmer was not affected because the employee
there waived his own individual rights, negating the need for the standard
to apply.41 Wright, like Gilmer, quickly became a road map of opportu-
nities and challenges for employers. Arbitration of statutory claims in
one proceeding is possible, but it must be via a carefully crafted docu-
ment of agreement, including "clear and unmistakable" waiver language.
As the Wright decision demonstrated, this is easier said than done.
D. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams
In 2001, the Supreme Court, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
held in favor of mandatory arbitration of unlawful employment discrimi-
31 See id. at 74.
32 See id.
33 Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 74 (1998).
34 Id. at 74-75.
35 Id. at 77-78.
36 See id. at 78-79.
37 Id. at 80 (emphasis added).
38 Id.
39 See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998).
40 See id.
41 See id. at 80-81.
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nation claims brought by a nonunionized employee. 42 Upon being hired
by Circuit City, Adams signed an employment contract that included a
mandatory arbitration agreement. 43 Two years later, when Adams filed
an employment discrimination suit in California, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) did not apply to employment contracts, and therefore Adams did
not have to use arbitration to settle his claim. 44 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to clarity the extent of the FAA's exemption for certain
contracts.
45
The Court held that the exemption to the FAA concerned only em-
ployment contracts of seamen, railroad employees, and those "actually
engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce. '46 The inter-
pretation used by the Ninth Circuit and others made the exemption super-
fluous. 47 According to the Supreme Court, if the exemption was meant
to apply to all contracts of employment, it would have said so.
48
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Circuit City decision for
present purposes is that the Court did not regard the former employee as
having irrevocably waived his statutory claims. 49 Rather, the Court
deemed Adams to have agreed to the arbitral, rather than judicial, forum
for the resolution of his statutory claims. 50 Thus, the Supreme Court set
the stage for its decision in Pyett on the grounds of the adequate waiver
of the right to bring statutory claims de novo-themes exhaustively
treated in Gilmer and Wright, and in a panorama of lower court
decisions.
II. THE EVOLUTION TOWARD 14 PENN PLAZA v. PYETT
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
A. Rogers v. New York University
In Rogers v. New York University,51 the Second Circuit addressed
whether a CBA could include a mandatory arbitration provision whereby
42 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
43 See id. at 110.
44 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999).
45 See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 111.
46 Id. at 112.
47 See id. at 113.
48 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113-14 (2001),
49 See id. at 123.
50 See id.
51 Rogers v. N.Y. Univ., 220 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2000). Other pre-Pyett decisions by the
Second Circuit were analogous to Rogers. See, e.g., Guyden v. Aetna Inc., 544 F.3d 379 (2d
Cir. 2008) (whistleblower claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are arbitrable); Fayer
v. Town of Middlebury, 258 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2001) (town employee could bring constitu-
tional claims in litigation subsequent to an adverse arbitration decision). New York state
courts, however, have held that mandatory arbitration is binding, and that corresponding waiv-
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employees waived their right to litigate statutory claims, including al-
leged unlawful employment discrimination, in federal court.52 Susan
Rogers was a clerical employee of New York University (NYU), and
subject to the CBA between NYU and Local 3882, United Staff Associa-
tion of NYU, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. 53 The CBA contained a no-
discrimination provision, guaranteeing employees the protections of all
federal and state discrimination laws, including the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).
54
Rogers went on medical leave under the FMLA in August 1997.
55
NYU terminated Rogers three months later, purportedly because her
leave time had expired. 56 She filed a claim of unlawful employment dis-
crimination with the EEOC, which issued her a right-to-sue letter.57 In
March 1998, she filed a lawsuit against NYU in federal court in the
Southern District of New York.58 In her claim, Rogers alleged that NYU
discriminated against her in violation of the FMLA, ADA, and the New
York State and City human rights laws.59
NYU moved to stay the lawsuit under § 3 of the FAA. 60 The dis-
trict court set forth two separate reasons for denying NYU's motion.
First, the court relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Gardner-Den-
ver for the principle that employees cannot waive their right, via a CBA,
to bring federal statutory actions in federal court. 61 Second, the district
court held that while Gardner-Denver is sufficient to resolve the issue,
the same conclusion could be reached by applying a different line of
ers of employee rights to bring lawsuits regarding statutory claims are legitimate and effective.
See, e.g., Sum v. Tishman Prop. Corp., 37 A.D.3d 284 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (upholding
mandatory arbitration because the waiver of the right to litigate met the Circuit City test of
being "clear and unmistakable"); Garcia v. Bellmarc Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 295 A.D.2d 233
(N.Y. App. Div. 2002) ("[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum.") (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001)).
52 See Rogers, 220 F.3d at 75.
53 Id. at 74.
54 See id. Pertinent sections of the CBA stated: (1) "There shall be no discrimination as
defined by applicable Federal, New York State, and New York City laws, against any present
or future employee by reason of ... physical or mental disability"; and (2) "Employees are
entitled to all provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ['FMLA'] that are not
specifically provided for in this agreement." Id. Another section of the agreement contained








61 See Rogers v. N.Y. Univ., No. 98 Civ. 2089, 1999 WL 710777, at **2-3 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 10, 1999).
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reasoning articulated by the Supreme Court in Wright.62 In Wright, the
Supreme Court suggested that a provision waiving an employee's right to
bring federal statutory actions in federal court may be enforceable under
certain circumstances; however, it held that a condition precedent to the
enforceability of such a provision is that the language of the waiver be
clear and unmistakable. 63 The district court held that the waiver in the
NYU CBA did not meet this important threshold of being a "clear and
unmistakable" waiver of Rogers' right to bring external litigation.
64
Consequently, even if such a waiver were not barred by Gardner-Den-
ver, it failed to meet the "clear and unmistakable" standard set forth in
Wright.
65
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding, maintain-
ing that both lines of reasoning were correct.66 It refused to enforce a
CBA's mandatory arbitration provision that would have resulted in a
waiver of an employee's right to litigate a statutory claim in federal
court.67 The Second Circuit explained that while Wright questioned
Gardner-Denver, the latter was not overruled and was still good law.
68
The Supreme Court denied NYU's petition for a writ of certiorari, 69 set-
ting the stage for Pyett.
B. Pyett v. Pennsylvania Building Co.
With its August 2007 decision in Pyett v. Pennsylvania Building
Co.,70 the Second Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Rogers.71 It held that
a CBA's purported mandatory arbitration provision was inoperative inso-
62 See id. at *4.
63 See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998).
64 See Rogers, 1999 WL 710777, at *4.
65 See id.
66 See Rogers v. N.Y. Univ., 220 F.3d 73, 74-77 (2d. Cir. 2000).
67 See id. at 75.
68 See id.
69 See N.Y. Univ. v. Rogers, 531 U.S. 1036 (2000).
70 See Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2007). Other federal courts of
appeals were in accord with the Second Circuit in refusing to enforce mandatory arbitration of
statutory claims. See, e.g., Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l v Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477
(D.C. Cir. 1999); Bratten v. SSI Services, Inc., 185 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1999); Albertson's, Inc.
v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, AFL-CIO & CLC, 157 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.
1998); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Sup-
ply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997) (individual worker must agree to waiver of right to
litigate statutory claims, and a union cannot waive such rights on the employee's behalf). But
see Aleman v. Chugach Support Serv. Inc., 485 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2007) (effectively ignoring
the Supreme Court's decisions, and upholding mandatory arbitration even though many em-
ployees did not have English language proficiency); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g
Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997); Martin v. Dana Corp., 114 F.3d 421 (3rd Cir. 1997)
(holding that Gilmer, not Gardner-Denver, controlled).
71 See Pyett, 498 F.3d at 91-93.
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far as it waived the worker's right to litigate federal statutory causes of
action in a judicial forum. 72
In Pyett, the plaintiffs, all over the age of fifty, were longtime em-
ployees of Temco Services Industries.73 They were originally employed
as night watchmen in a commercial office building. 74 The plaintiffs were
also members of Local 32BJ of the Service Employees International
Union (SEIU), and were subject to a CBA between the Union and the
Realty Advisory Board (RAB) on Labor Relations, Inc., the bargaining
association for the real estate industry in New York City.75 The 2002
"Contractors Agreement," governing the period from January 1, 2002
through September 30, 2004, covered the events giving rise to this
matter.
76
SEIU and the RAB have had a labor management relationship, re-
flected in a CBA, since the 1930s.77 Since 1999, the CBA has expressly
provided that employment discrimination claims are subject to
mandatory arbitration:
There shall be no discrimination against any present or
future employee by reason of race, creed, color, age, dis-
ability, national origin, sex, union membership, or any
characteristic protected by law, including, but not lim-
ited to, claims made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, the New York State
Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights
Code, New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, New
Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, Con-
necticut Fair Employer Practices Act, or any other simi-
lar laws, rules or regulations. All such claims shall be
subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure (Arti-
cles V and VI [of the CBA]) as the sole and exclusive
remedy for violations. Arbitrators shall apply appropri-
ate law in rendering decisions based upon claims of
discrimination.
78
Plaintiffs filed a grievance with SEIU in August 2003, protesting
their reassignment from night watchmen positions to less desirable posi-




76 See Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2007).
77 See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1461 (2009).
78 Pyett, 498 F.3d at 90 (quoting the CBA).
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tions as porters and cleaners. 79 They alleged the unwelcome reassign-
ment was made because they were the only building employees over the
age of fifty. 80 The plaintiffs also alleged violations of seniority rules and
failure of the employer to equitably rotate and allocate overtime opportu-
nities. 81 They alleged that the transfer was in violation of the CBA's
provisions prohibiting, inter alia, unlawful age discrimination. 82
After the first day of the arbitration hearing, SEIU declined to pur-
sue the age discrimination claims, addressing only those elements of the
grievance based on denials of overtime and promotions.83 SEIU had
consented to the Penn Plaza management bringing in Spartan Security to
provide security services previously performed by Temco. 84 SEIU be-
lieved that this did not constitute unlawful age discrimination.85 On Feb-
ruary 23, 2004, they sent a letter to the Contract Arbitrator, Earl Pfeffer,
formally withdrawing the age discrimination claims from arbitration. 86
Between August 2004 and August 2005, there were several hearings in
the arbitration of the remaining overtime and promotion claims. 87 On
August 10, 2005, the arbitrator issued a written decision denying the
grievances. 8
8
In May 2004, while the arbitration was still ongoing, the plaintiffs
also filed charges of age discrimination with the EEOC.89 The EEOC
subsequently notified the plaintiffs of their right to sue the employer in
federal district court for unlawful age discrimination. 90 On September
23, 2004, the employees commenced an action in federal district court in
the Southern District of New York against both Temco and the owners of
the building in which they were employed. 91 The employees alleged vio-
lations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the New York
State Administrative Code, and the New York State Human Rights
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1462.
82 Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2007).
83 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, 14 Penn Plaza LLC, v. Pyett 129 S. Ct. 1456
(No. 07-581). The Industry (the Real Estate owners and operators collectively) has approxi-
mately 700 grievances annually going to arbitration. See id. The parties therefore created their
own office of the contract arbitrator, rather than work through an impartial non-profit ADR
provider, such as the American Arbitration Association. See id.
84 See Pyett, 498 F.3d at 91.
85 See id.
86 See Brief for the Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 16, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (No. 07-
581).
87 See Pyett, 498 F.3d at 90-91.
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Law. 92 Further, the employees claimed that the SEIU violated its duty of
fair representation by its failure to pursue the age discrimination claims
during the arbitration. 93 The defendants moved for dismissal, arguing
that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted
and, in the alternative, to compel arbitration.
94
The district court denied both motions.95 The court relied on its
decision in Granados v. Harvard Maintenance96 to conclude that a
"union-negotiated waiver of a right to litigate certain federal and state
statutory claims in a judicial forum is unenforceable. '97 The defendants
appealed, claiming that the Supreme Court's decision regarding arbitra-
tion provisions in Gilmer permitted the enforcement of the mandatory
arbitration provision. 98 However, the Second Circuit agreed with the dis-
trict court's reasoning that Gilmer applied to arbitration clauses solely in
individual contracts, and not to CBAs,99 and upheld the district court's
conclusion that Gilmer did not apply here because the plaintiffs were
subject to a CBA and did not have Gilmer-like individual employment
contracts.100 The Second Circuit relied on its ruling in Rogers to hold
that Gardner-Denver controlled the case at issue.101
The Second Circuit further held that the Supreme Court's decision
in Wright, which contained dicta strongly suggesting that in some cir-
cumstances a union-negotiated waiver of a worker's right to litigate stat-
utory claims in federal court could be enforceable, did not itself overrule
Gardner-Denver.10 2 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's re-
fusal to enforce the labor contract's mandatory arbitration provision. 10 3
It held that Rogers governed, as Rogers was not overruled by Gilmer or
Wright.104 Thus, the Second Circuit's holding in Pyett established that a
CBA cannot waive a worker's right to litigate statutory claims in federal
court. 105
92 Id.
93 See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1462 n.2 (2009).
94 See Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2007).
95 See Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., No. 04 Civ. 7536, 2006 WL 1520517 (S.D.N.Y. June 1,
2006).
96 Granados v. Harv. Maint., No. 05 Civ. 5489, 2006 WL 435731 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 22,
2006).
97 Pyett, 2006 WL 1520517, at *3.
98 See Pyett, 498 F.3d at 91.
99 See id.
100 See Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2007).
101 See id. at 91 n.3.
102 See id. at 92-93.
103 See id. at 93-94.
104 See id.
105 See id. at 93-95. This is quite analogous to the principle set forth in 1999 by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1999): "Unless the Congress has precluded
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The Second Circuit reiterated that Gardner-Denver "remains good
law," and held in Pyett "that a collective agreement could not waive cov-
ered workers' rights to a judicial forum for causes of action created by
Congress." 10 6 The Second Circuit thus endeavored to meld the princi-
ples of Gardner-Denver and Gilmer, holding that, while a non-unionized
individual could elect arbitration of statutory claims, no labor union
could institutionally bind its individual constituent members and fellow
employees via such a waiver mechanism in a labor contract. 107 This
manifest incongruity, as well as the unresolved issues left in the wake of
the Wright decision, militated strongly in favor of the grant of certiorari
by the Supreme Court.108
Unsurprisingly, most of the courts of appeals that examined whether
a union and employer could require unionized employees to bring all of
their statutory employment discrimination claims to arbitration, and thus
be foreclosed from external litigation of those claims, had consistently
maintained that only the Supreme Court could clarify and prioritize the
constellation of pertinent decisions flowing from Gardner-Denver.10 9
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN 14 PENN PLAZA V. PYETT
On April 1, 2009, a sharply divided Supreme Court overturned the
Second Circuit's decision in Pyett, holding that "a collective bargaining
agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbi-
trate ADEA claims is enforceable as matter of federal law." 110
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, disagreed with the Second
Circuit's unduly broad understanding of the Supreme Court's 1974 deci-
sion in Gardner-Denver.III Specifically, Justice Thomas did not believe
his doing so, an individual may prospectively waive his own statutory right to a judicial forum,
but his union may not prospectively waive that right for him."
106 Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 91 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007).
107 See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1463 (2009).
108 See id. at 1463; see also id. at 1463 n.4 (identifying conflicting decisions among the
circuits, including Rogers v. N.Y Univ., 220 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2000); O'Brien v. Town of
Agawam, 350 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 2003); Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2003);
Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 288 F.3d 313 (7th Cir. 2002); E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Massey,
373 F.3d 530 (4th Cir. 2004)).
109 See, e.g., Brisentine v. Stone and Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 525 (1lth Cir.
1997) ("It may be that the Supreme Court has cut Alexander [v. Gardner-Denver] back so far
that it will not survive. Perhaps, but we are not convinced we are authorized to sing the dirge
of Alexander [v. Gardner-Denver]. We will leave that to the Supreme Court."); Pryner v.
Tractor Supply Co. Inc. 109 F.3d 354, 364 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that any lower court's
interpretation of the Gardner-Denver and Gilmer continuum could be inherently problematic
and that it was up to the Supreme Court to clarify matters)
110 Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1474.
111 See id. at 1461.
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that the decision in Gardner-Denver somehow forbade the arbitration of
the statutory ADEA claim in the case at issue. 112 According to the Pyett
majority, Gardner-Denver did not deal with the Pyett issue of enforcing
an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims.1 13 Rather, Gardner focused
on a separate and distinct issue: whether "arbitration of contract-based
claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims."
114
Justice Thomas explained that the Second Circuit faced a dissimilar situ-
ation in Pyett-a CBA containing an arbitration provision that included
both contractual and statutory discrimination claims-thus, reliance on
Gardner-Denver was inappropriate.' 
15
Justice Thomas noted that, from the outset, the labor contract's very
broad arbitration provision was the product of good faith negotiations.
16
The parties expressly decided that statutory claims "would be resolved in
arbitration."' 1 7 The majority opinion noted that "this freely negotiated
term between the Union and the RAB easily qualifies as a 'condition of
employment' that is subject to mandatory bargaining."' 18 Justice
Thomas concluded:
Examination of the two federal statutes at issue in this
case, therefore, yields a straightforward answer to the
question presented: the NLRA provided the union and
the RAB with statutory authority to collectively bargain
for arbitration of workplace discrimination claims, and
Congress did not terminate that authority with respect to
federal age-discrimination claims in the ADEA. Ac-
cordingly, there is no legal basis for the Court to strike
down an arbitration clause in this CBA, which was
freely negotiated by the Union and the RAB, which
clearly and unmistakably requires respondents to arbi-
trate the age-discrimination claims at issue in this ap-
peal. Congress has chosen to allow arbitration of ADEA
claims. The Judiciary must respect that choice. 119
112 See id.
113 See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1466 (2009).
114 Id. at 1459 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991)).
115 See id. at 1459.
116 Id. at 1464. The NLRB has held that the labor contract's grievance arbitration mecha-
nism is a mandatory subject of bargaining. It cannot be unilaterally imposed by the employer.
See Util. Vault Co., 345 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (2005). If the grievance arbitration mechanism is so
broad as to seem to preclude anyone from filing charges with the NLRB, such an over-broad
provision would be unlawful. See U Haul Company of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (2006).
117 Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1464.
118 Id. (citing Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 199 (1991)).
119 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1466 (2009).
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To the majority, it is Congress, not the Court, that establishes fed-
eral labor policy, and the broad arbitration provision clearly and unmis-
takably negotiated by the parties is fully congruent with the
congressional policy choice favoring arbitration over litigation as the
preferred means of settling labor disputes. 120 Pyett broadened this policy
choice to include mandatory labor arbitration of employment discrimina-
tion claims if such arbitration is required by a CBA.
121
The majority acknowledged that Gardner-Denver and its progeny
contained extensive dicta that criticized arbitration as an inappropriate
forum for the resolution of statutory employment discrimination
claims. 122 Justice Thomas opined that this critical, problematic dicta was
a result of a negative, parochial, and hostile view of arbitration that had
"fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal
statutes favoring this method [labor arbitration] of resolving [employ-
ment discrimination] disputes."' 1 3 The "misconceptions" about arbitra-
tors lacking sufficient expertise with Title VII and other statutory rights-
based antidiscrimination law "have been corrected."' 24 Justice Thomas
summarized for the majority: "We recognize that ... the Gardner-Den-
ver line of cases included broad dicta that was highly critical of the use
of arbitration for the vindication of statutory antidiscrimination rights.
That skepticism, however, rested on a misconceived view of arbitration
that this Court has since abandoned."'
125
Justice Thomas explained that the majority was not overruling
Gardner-Denver; rather, Gardner-Denver was simply inapplicable with
respect to Pyett: "Gardner-Denver and its progeny thus do not control
the outcome where, as is the case here, the collective bargaining agree-
ment's arbitration provision expressly covers both statutory and contrac-
tual discrimination claims."' 126 Justice Thomas stated in a footnote that if
Gardner-Denver had applied, the Court would likely have overruled it
due to the Court's current pro-arbitration jurisprudence.
127
By avoiding a direct confrontation with Gardner-Denver via sum-
mary judicial fiat, the majority also conveniently dodged what the
Wright Court identified as the 'tension' between the two lines of cases
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 See id. at 1470.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1471.
125 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469 (2009).
126 Id.
127 See id. at 1469 n.8. Justice Thomas relied on Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 173 (1989), which stated that "it is appropriate to overrule a decision where there
'has been [an] intervening development of the law' such that the earlier 'decision [is] irrecon-
cilable with competing legal doctrines and policies.'"
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represented by Gardner-Denver and Gilmer.128 In a preemptive repudia-
tion of Justice Souter's dissent, the Pyett majority accused him of
"wrench[ing]... out of context" what he portrayed as "Wright's charac-
terization of Gardner-Denver as raising a seemingly absolute prohibition
of union waiver of employees' federal forum rights," and concluded that
"Wright therefore neither endorsed Gardner-Denver's broad language
nor suggested a particular result in this case."
129
Summarizing Gardner-Denver, Barrentine, and McDonald, Justice
Thomas characterized the underlying facts in those three earlier cases
favoring litigation over arbitration of statutory claims as "reveal[ing] the
narrow scope of the legal rule arising from that trilogy of decisions."
130
The majority concluded that the Denver trilogy of cases
made clear that the Gardner-Denver line of cases 'did
not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agree-
ment to arbitrate statutory claims.' Those decisions in-
stead 'involved the quite different issue whether
arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subse-
quent judicial resolution of statutory claims. Since the
employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their statu-
tory claims, and the labor arbitrators were not authorized
to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases un-
derstandably was held not to preclude subsequent statu-
tory actions.'131
The Court, reiterating that "federal antidiscrimination rights may
not be prospectively waived,"' 132 found no such waiver in Pyett. "The
decision to resolve ADEA claims by way of arbitration instead of litiga-
tion does not waive the statutory right to be free from workplace age
discrimination; it waives only the right to seek relief from a court in the
first instance."133 Further, "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it
only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, fo-
rum."' 134 The arbitration decision remains subject to judicial review. 135
128 Cf. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1469 n.8 (citing Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525
U.S. 70, 76 (1998)).
129 Id. at 1469 n.7 (internal quotations omitted).
130 Id. at 1468.
131 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1468 (2009) (quoting Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991)).
132 Id. at 1469 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(C) (2006)).
133 Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26).
134 Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985)).
135 See id. at 1471 n.10.
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Justice Thomas stated that to read Gardner-Denver as somehow
prohibiting all waivers of all statutory rights "reveals a distorted under-
standing of the compromise made when an employee agrees to compul-
sory arbitration." 136 Therefore, the majority ultimately concluded that
"because today's decision does not contradict the holding of Gardner-
Denver, we need not resolve the stare decisis concerns raised by the dis-
senting opinions." 137 Nevertheless, in a possible preview of coming at-
tractions, the majority all but sounded the death knell for the Gardner-
Denver line of cases, concluding that "given the development of this
Court's arbitration jurisprudence in the intervening years ... Gardner-
Denver would appear to be a strong candidate for overruling if the dis-
sents' broad view of its holding were correct." 
38
In upholding the enforcement of the arbitration clause, the majority
not only dispelled the Second Circuit's Gardner-Denver analysis as inap-
plicable, but also explained why the very broad arbitration provision in
Pyett should be enforced. The majority held that the arbitration clause
was a "freely negotiated term between the Union and the RAB [that]
easily qualifies as a 'condition of employment' that is subject to
mandatory bargaining" under 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).139 Accordingly, the
clause must be enforced unless the ADEA itself specifically removed
grievances made under it from the NLRA's authority. 140 The majority
referred to the holding in Gilmer that the ADEA does not prohibit arbi-
trating claims brought under the statute. 14 1 Accordingly, in Pyett, a
clause calling for the arbitration of an ADEA claim brought by a union
member bound by the CBA was enforceable.
142
The Pyett majority declined to resolve several issues. Pyett and his
colleagues also made separate arguments that the arbitration clause was
not clear and unmistakable, which could nullify its validity. 143 The ma-
jority declined to address this issue as the class of grievants did not raise
the argument in the lower courts. 144 Additionally, the grievants argued
that the arbitration clause functioned as a waiver of their federal right
under the ADEA, as it precluded them from a federal judicial forum, and
136 Id. at 1470.
137 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469 n.8 (2009).
138 Id. at 1469.
139 Id. at 1464 (citing Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 199 (1991)).
140 See id. at 1465.
141 See id. 1464-65 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-33
(1991)).
142 See id. at 1466.
143 See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1462 (2009).
144 See id. at 1463.
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also permitted the union to block arbitration. 45 However, the majority
explained that since this issue was not fully briefed, and there were ex-
isting factual disputes, it would not resolve this issue either. 146 Finally,
whether the labor contract allows the union to prevent employees "from
'effectively vindicating' their 'federal statutory rights in the arbitral fo-
rum'" remains an open question for a future day.
147
B. The Dissents
Justice Souter's dissent was joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and
Ginsburg. They maintained that Gardner-Denver established a "seem-
ingly absolute prohibition of union waiver of employees' federal forum
rights," which was expressly reaffirmed by the Court in Wright.148 As
Justice Souter noted: "In sum, Gardner-Denver held that an individual's
statutory right of freedom from discrimination and access to court for
enforcement were beyond a union's power to waive."' 149 This holding
had been "repeated over the years and generally understood," and the
majority ignored the principle of stare decisis by radically diverging from
the rationale of Gardner-Denver and enforcing the arbitration clause.
150
Justice Souter's dissent asserted that if the Gardner-Denver holding was
actually as narrow as the majority found, then for thirty-five years the
Court had been "wreaking havoc on the truth" when it held that there
was an absolute prohibition of union waiver of employee's federal forum
rights: 15
The majority evades the precedent of Gardner-Denver as
long as it can simply by ignoring it.... [B]ut the issue is
settled and the time is too late by 35 years to make the
bald assertion that '[n]othing in the law suggests a dis-
tinction between the status of arbitration agreements
signed by the individual employee and those agreed to
by a union representative.' In fact, we recently and
unanimously said that the principle that 'federal forum
rights cannot be waived in union-negotiated CBAs even
if they can be waived in individually executed contracts
... assuredly finds support in' our case law, and every
145 See id. at 1474. The majority noted that "a substantive waiver of federally protected
civil rights will not be upheld." Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
146 See id.
147 Id. (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)).
148 Id. at 1477 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525
U.S. 70, 80 (1998)).
149 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1478 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting).
150 See id. at 1481.
151 Id. at 1480.
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Court of Appeals save one has read our decisions as
holding to this position.
52
Interestingly, Justice Souter's dissent also noted that the majority
opinion may ultimately be of little consequence, other than being a glar-
ing, infamous incident of dramatic and unwarranted judicial repudiation
of the principle of stare decisis. 153 Justice Souter explained that the ma-
jority left open a significant question, as it "explicitly reserves the ques-
tion whether a CBA's waiver of a judicial forum is enforceable when the
union controls access to and presentation of employees' claims in arbitra-
tion." 154 Justice Souter explained that this is often the situation, and it is
likely that this issue, which has been a point of contention for almost four
decades, will remain a source of controversy unless and until it is defini-
tively resolved by a future Supreme Court decision.
1 55
Perhaps most strikingly, Justice Souter's dissent identified the prin-
ciples of stare decisis that the majority abandoned:
Principles of stare decisis demand respect for precedent
whether judicial methods of interpretation change or stay
the same. Were that not so, those principles would fail
to achieve the legal stability that they seek and upon
which the rule of law depends. And considerations of
stare decisis have special force over an issue of statutory
interpretation . . . Once we have construed a statute,
stability is the rule, and we will not depart from it with-
out some compelling justification. There is no argument
for abandoning precedent here, and Gardner-Denver
controls. 156
Justice Stevens, who joined Justice Souter's dissent, also wrote sep-
arately to emphasize his profound disagreement with the majority's repu-
diation of stare decisis. 157 Justice Stevens forcefully asserted that the
majority arrogantly ignored public policy appropriately established by
Congress: "The Court's derision of that 'policy concern' is particularly
disingenuous given its subversion of Gardner-Denver's holding in the
service of an extratextual policy favoring arbitration." 158 Justice Stevens
was deeply disturbed by the raw judicial activism of the Court's major-
ity, particularly since Gardner-Denver established quite unequivocally
152 Id. at 1478-79 (quoting Wright, 535 U.S. at 77).
153 See id. at 1478.
154 Id. at 1481.
155 See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1481 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 1478 (internal quotations omitted).
157 See id. at 1474 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("My concern regarding the Court's subver-
sion of precedent to the policy favoring arbitration prompts these additional remarks.").
158 Id. at 1476.
2010]
450 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19:429
that "Congress did not intend to permit" mandatory arbitration of statu-
tory claims. 159 Justice Stevens concluded that "in the absence of an in-
tervening amendment to the relevant statutory language, we are bound by
that decision. It is for Congress, rather than this Court, to reassess the
policy arguments favoring arbitration and revise the relevant provisions
to reflect its views."'
160
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. Jurisprudential Realpolitik, Political Ideology, Stare Decisis, and
Justice Souter's Labor Finale
The jurisprudential realpolitik of the Pyett decision is dramatically
obvious. Stark ideological and political warfare continues between the
Court's core conservative majority and the liberal minority. This is thor-
oughly transparent and yields no surprises. The conservatives favor ma-
jor institutional interests of employers and of unions, at workers'
expense. Concomitantly, the liberal minority is relatively more solici-
tous of workers, especially individuals who are sometimes shabbily
treated by unions and employers or, at the very least, are generally more
vulnerable and have fewer resources than these institutional counterparts.
Justice Souter's dissent treats Pyett as an aberration. Justice Souter
was especially incensed that such a potentially tectonic shift so inimical
to workers' interests was the shameless product of blatant activist arro-
gance by an ideological majority openly contemptuous of stare decisis
and thirty-five years of the well-established Gardner-Denver line of
cases. 161 Justice Souter hoped that the Gardner-Denver rationale would
not only continue to percolate under Pyett's ill-fitting and unstable lid,
but that Gardner-Denver would, under a new liberal majority, soon
reemerge and be reestablished as the controlling law, substantially
strengthened, paradoxically, by the Pyett dissents. With the exceptions
of Gilmer and Pyett, the Supreme Court has eschewed the integrated co-
herence of arbitration for the dynamic of a labor arbitration followed by
external litigation de novo regarding statutory employment discrimina-
tion claims.
Nevertheless, to attempt to somehow resuscitate the dated Gardner-
Denver rationale would be a mistake. Pyett deserves a fair opportunity
to work. While there are a multitude of open questions flowing from the
ramifications, both intended and.unintended, of the majority's decision,
the major elements of justice and fairness to employees, employers, and
159 See id.
160 Id.
161 See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1476-77 (2009) (Souter, J.,
disssenting).
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unions are within Pyett probabilities, and they deserve the opportunity to
become operational.
B. Why the Court's "Right" Result Isn't Wrong
The argument for continuing fealty to the thirty-five-year-old Gard-
ner-Denver rationale is, at best, anemic and out of touch with positive
developments -in labor and employment arbitration in recent years. As
Justice Holmes would remind us, it is a poor excuse to have a law just
because it was a law in the time of King Henry IV.162 Even assuming
there ever was any legitimate basis for anyone to fear that prominent
labor arbitrators notoriously lacked sufficient expertise in employment
discrimination law, these concerns are simply not well-founded today.
The American Arbitration Association, for example, conducts fastidious
scrutiny of the already highly qualified and accomplished arbitrators it
admits to its panels of arbitrators available to prospective parties. It also
demands that each arbitrator make a career-long commitment to the
state-of-the-art study of arbitration.
163
On the eve of a half-century of Supreme Court enthusiasm for labor
arbitration, manifested in its 1960 landmark Steelworkers Trilogy deci-
sions, 164 the Pyett Court reached the correct result, via admittedly some-
what problematic and truncated reasoning that could potentially cause a
degree of jurisprudential and practical instability in labor arbitration and
in the courts. However, the Pyett decision, having achieved the correct
result, deserves the opportunity to work in the real world, and parties
with such omnibus arbitration provisions in their CBAs deserve the bene-
fit of their one bite at the integrated, globalized apple.
The phenomenon of the Court reaching the correct result, despite,
rather than through its particular reasoning, does occur.165 As a practical
matter, it is obviously better to have a sound and workable decision,
rather than an unworkable result flowing from complex abstract jurispru-
dential theory.
162 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469
(1897).
163 See generally American Arbitration Association, Qualification Criteria for Admit-
tance to the AAA National Roster of Arbitrators, http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4223 (last vis-
ited Nov. 10, 2009) (listing the requirements necessary for admittance into the American
Arbitration Association). Professor Gregory, the lead author of this Article, is a member of the
National Academy of Arbitrators, and he serves on, inter alia, the labor and the employment
arbitrator panels of the American Arbitration Association and United States Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service.
164 United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
165 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 9 (deploring the reasoning of Roe v. Wade, while still favor-
ing the result).
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The great practical utility and insight of these principles are espe-
cially true in labor and employment law. Pyett is certainly not the first,
nor will it be the last decision of the Supreme Court that, while not ele-
gantly grounded in sophisticated jurisprudential metaphysics, may never-
theless work well and yield just and fair results for employees,
employers, and unions. Whether Gardner-Denver or Pyett controls, the
stakes are significant for everyone. Unions will have continuing con-
cerns about exposure to liability from lawsuits alleging breach of the
union duty of fair representation under either model.
166
The employer, 14 Penn Plaza LLC, warned during oral argument
before the Supreme Court that "forbidding unions from bargaining about
the procedural right to an arbitral forum will carve a judicial exception
into the labor law permitting employees to bypass the union and deal
directly with their employees, defeating Congress's national labor pol-
icy." 16 7 To bring all grievance claims, including those involving statu-
tory rights, such as employment discrimination claims, into one
integrated arbitration could be problematic, however. The grievance pro-
cess could become rigid. If the parties begin taking all statutory claims
into arbitration, the dispute resolution process could become flooded
with grievances and with both parties feeling little can be gained by set-
tling grievances earlier in the procedure. 168 Yet, to repudiate Pyett
would undermine the role of the union as the exclusive bargaining agent,
and would encourage employees to deal directly with employers, in dero-
gation of Congress's central role in setting "national labor policy. 1 69 To
effectuate Pyett, however, also poses many challenges and raises a host
of implicit unanswered procedural and substantive questions.
Perhaps the most thoughtful and realistic template as to whether,
and under what circumstances, employees represented by labor unions
and subject to the protections of anti-discrimination provisions in CBAs
may be bound to arbitrate, rather than litigate, statutory claims was set
forth by the Eleventh Circuit in Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Engineer-
ing Corp. in 1997.170 In Brisentine, an employee brought an action
against his employer in federal district court, alleging violations of the
166 Perhaps union concerns about Union DFR litigation are overwrought. See Mitchell
Rubinstein, Duty of Fair Representation Jurisprudential Reform: The Need to Adjudicate Dis-
putes in Internal Union Review Tribunals and the Forgotten Remedy of Re-Arbitration, 42 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 517 (2009). But that does not translate necessarily into any reduction in
the volume of Union DFR litigation that is filed.




170 See Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 526-27 (11th Cir.
1997).
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ADA.171 The defendant employer moved for summary judgment, con-
tending that the plaintiff's claims were subject to a mandatory arbitration
clause in the CBA. 172 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the employer, which the employee then appealed.'
73
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the
mandatory arbitration provision of the labor contract was unenforce-
able. 174 The appellate court made several distinctions between Gardner-
Denver and Gilmer, and ultimately decided that it would not enforce the
union-negotiated waiver of a judicial forum for statutory claims. 75 In
reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit formulated a three-part an-
alytical framework derived from Gardner-Denver and Gilmer.176 First,
the employee must have expressly individually agreed to the waiver of
the right to bring statutory claims in court. 177 Second, the parties must
have expressly authorized the arbitrator to resolve statutory claims. 178
Third, and perhaps most dramatically, the individual employee has the
right to take statutory claims to arbitration, 179 which, more than coinci-
dentally, Penn Plaza emphasized during oral argument before the Su-
preme Court in Pyett.180 Pointing to the black letter language of the
CBA, Penn Plaza argued that "all claims" regarding statutory rights are
required to be arbitrated.' 81 Therefore, if the union, for whatever reason,
does not pursue the statutory claims of individual grievants to arbitration,
"the individuals then have [the right] to go to arbitration with their pri-
vate counsel ... and have their claims heard in the arbitral forum."'
1 82
The Pyett employer expressly stated at oral argument: "As this
Court has approved in Gilmer, what we are talking about is moving the
forum from the judicial one to the arbitral one."'18 3 Justice Scalia framed
the essence of the matter astutely at oral argument: "[Ilif the union
chooses not to arbitrate [the grievance regarding statutory claims] the
171 See id. at 520.
172 See id.
173 See id.
174 See id. at 526-27.
175 See id.
176 See Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 523-27 (11th Cir.
1997).
177 See id. at 526.
178 See id. at 527.
179 See id.




183 Id. at 16.
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individual must have the right to arbitrate it on his own,"18 4 a framing of
the issue that the employer "wholeheartedly endorse[d]."'
18 5
This has stunning possibilities, and could utterly transform labor ar-
bitration in deeply problematic ways. The employer, union, and employ-
ees/grievants usually design grievance negotiations to fairly and justly
resolve grievance disputes well prior to arbitration. Both institutional
employer and union interests are especially implicated, as are the inter-
ests of most grievants in obtaining fair resolution of grievances through
good faith negotiations at the lower, quicker, and more immediate steps
of the labor contract's grievance procedure.
Pyett poses many challenges and opportunities for the conventional
grievance and arbitration procedure. If the union does not pursue the
statutory employment discrimination claims to arbitration, would the
union likely have greater exposure to suits alleging breach of the union's
duty of fair representation? Is Pyett thus a full employment bill for attor-
neys seeking to work within, or be retained by, labor unions? How
many, if any, unions currently have sufficient internal expertise to evalu-
ate correctly and work within a Pyett grievance presentation and negotia-
tion dynamic up to, and including, arbitration? Would the presence of a
statutory claim pressed by a grievant's personal attorney debilitate the
union's prerogatives as the NLRA Section 9 exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative? What are most unions' prospects if they refuse outright, or
grudgingly admit, and resent, interactions with private attorneys? What
are the ethical responsibilities of any attorney in such a dynamic-espe-
cially, what is the role and duty of the private attorney? Who pays the
attorney's fees for private counsel successfully representing a grievant at
the arbitration, with the union absent and not in the picture for any num-
bers of reasons?
Pyett may have the unintended, ominous consequence of having
ushered everyone into a limbo-like no-man's land. Many of the open
questions in this post-Pyett litany implicitly assume that if an institu-
tional union decides not to pursue a grievant's statutory claim to arbitra-
tion, the union nevertheless will necessarily allow the grievant to hire
private counsel to represent the grievant at a union-less arbitration with
the employer, with the union absorbing the private counsel legal fees. 186
Obviously, this is a large leap, and may not be the case. In Pyett, the
union informed its employees that they could individually present their
statutory claims before the arbitrator, and that their own private counsel
could represent them, but that their attorney's fees and the arbitration
184 Id. at 17.
185 Id.
186 Cf Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Assignment of Labor Arbitration, 81 ST. JoHN's L. REV.
41 (2007).
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fees would be the responsibility of the individual worker, and not of the
union. 187 For all practical purposes, that could well be the end of the
matter, since few grievants have the financial means to hire private coun-
sel and absorb a share of the arbitrator's fee.
Certainly not least is the central practical question-who really
pays? 188 What if the statutory claim grievant does not have funds suffi-
cient to hire private counsel to take those statutory claims to arbitration?
If the union is institutionally responsible for the cost of the grievant's
attorney, it would probably be more cost-efficient for the union itself to
take every statutory claim to arbitration. If, however, every statutory
claim can come to arbitration, what incentive is there for the employer
and the union to bargain for resolution of the grievance in the lower steps
of the labor contract's grievance procedure?
Discovery could proliferate dramatically, with corresponding mo-
tion practice becoming virtually ubiquitous. These dimensions, imported
from employment discrimination law, could flood and freeze the CBA's
grievance arbitration system with meritless grievances to the detriment of
meritorious grievances now inexorably subjected to interminable delays
in an increasingly clogged and dysfunctional arbitration system.
Furthermore, would the arbitrator have the authority to award the
full range of remedies typically available in employment discrimination,
including compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees to the
prevailing party, and who would pay them? If so, where would such
arbitral authority be grounded? Would it implicitly flow from the Pyett
decision? Or would the labor contract have to be formally amended to
allow the full range of damages and remedies available in federal court?
Adding compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees consid-
erations to the Pyett equation will significantly transform the conven-
tional labor arbitration of the pre-Pyett era, making it unrecognizable.
The parties do have influence in this post-Pyett world. If the Pyett
process becomes very expensive for the institutional parties, they remain
the masters of their conduct-nothing compels parties to violate statutory
employment discrimination law, for example. If the Pyett process be-
comes too burdensome and loses many of the distinct advantages that
labor arbitration offers-specifically, significantly less time and less ex-
pense to present the case in arbitration-and instead becomes the func-
187 See Brief for Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (No. 07-581);
Barry Winograd, A New Day Dawning Or Dark Clouds On The Horizon? The Potential Im-
pact Of The Pyett Case, 59 LAB. L. J. 227, 228 (2008).
188 See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Harry T.
Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in Employ-
ment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. Rav. 293 (1999); Kenneth May, Labor Lawyers at ABA Session
Debate Role of American Arbitration Association, DAILY LAB. REP., Feb. 15, 1996, at A-12.
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tional equivalent of an endless federal court case extracting every last
dime from the parties, the parties are also the masters, presumably, of
their CBA. They are certainly free to negotiate down the many matters
subject to the grievance arbitration process of the labor contract.
For example, if Pyett proves difficult to implement in practice, par-
ties could negotiate new labor contract language that could bar bringing
most, if not all, anti-discrimination matters into the grievance arbitration
mechanisms of the labor contract while pledging all parties to the spirit
and letter of all applicable federal, state, and local statutory law. While
this may not make for the best public relations or most enlightened
human resources-seemingly making the union and the employer appear
as regressive and reactionary endorsers of unlawful employment discrim-
ination-Gardner-Denver emains the fully lawful default position in the
event that Pyett is not workable, as the Pyett majority readily stated that
their holding does not reach, let alone overrule, Gardner-Denver.
Labor arbitration has many virtues, ranging from time and cost effi-
ciency, due to minimal discovery and no pre-hearing motion practice, to
no shifting of compensatory or punitive damages or attorney's fees to the
loser. Institutional employers and unions, over time, develop mature and
productive relationships, making labor grievance arbitration an important
part, but only a part, of the parties' larger labor management dynamic.
Under the Pyett regime, however, there is at least the potential that some
of these salient positive attributes of labor arbitration could be quickly
debilitated. If the Pyett-era arbitration system becomes flooded with
statutory-rights claimants accompanied by their personal attorneys suing
the union and the employer with hybrid Section 301/breach of the
union's duty of fair representation claims, all of whom are resolutely
headed for the labor arbitration of their statutory claim as a matter of
right, the institutional parties will amend their labor contracts to much
more carefully contour Pyett issues.
In the latter instance, employers pleased with the unitary, integrated
result achieved in Pyett may come to rue the day that they no longer had
to worry about Gardner-Denver external litigation of statutory claims
subsequent to the labor arbitration. In the Pyett era, as employers may
face arbitration of statutory claims as a matter of employee rights, a
flooded grievance arbitration system overloaded with individual griev-
ants represented by their private attorneys, resolved to arbitrate, does not
present an attractive picture. Under this parade of horribles, it is possible
that the employer could be held entirely responsible for the fees of both
the grievant's private, personal attorney and for the fees of the arbitrator
in those statutory rights cases that the union declines to take to
arbitration.
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Nevertheless, despite the many formidable challenges, the undenia-
ble advantages of a unitary labor arbitration of all claims are very signifi-
cant, with probable time, cost, and efficiency economies. In short order,
meritless claims at labor arbitration are going to lose, and the corre-
sponding word will quickly spread among the workers. Accordingly,
statutory claims of merit will be addressed, either in arbitration or in
court. Those employers and unions refusing to adopt Pyett language in
their labor contract will thereby not be exempt from litigation externally
in court for statutory claims that may be brought. Rather, in the absence
of an omnibus Pyett-like grievance arbitration definition in the labor con-
tract, external litigation is guaranteed.
CONCLUSION
On the eve of the half-century anniversary of the landmark Steel-
workers Trilogy, the most classic of the many Supreme Court enthusias-
tic endorsements of labor arbitration as the preferred means of dispute
resolution in the unionized labor-management relationship, much re-
mains to be said for the reinvigoration and unequivocal restoration of
Gardner-Denver precedent. But, much can also be said for judicial def-
erence to the successful bargain made by the parties endeavoring to util-
ize the unitary labor arbitration as the integrated setting for the resolution
of all contractual and statutory claims.
Pyett is a significant, but not radical, exception to the Gardner-Den-
ver genre of dispute resolution modalities. For all practical purposes,
unless the union and the employer expressly negotiate a Pyett provision
mandating omnibus inclusion of statutory claims in the grievance arbitra-
tion procedure, Gardner-Denver remains the default position. If there is
no Pyett provision, then Gardner-Denver controls, with the potential for
statutory claims being subsequently litigated in court de novo after the
conclusion of an arbitration proceeding that lacks any res judicata or col-
lateral estoppel force.
Meanwhile, unfortunately due to the transparent bitterness among
some of the ideologically driven Justices, and the equally raw activism
marginalizing and subordinating Gardner-Denver (yet purportedly not
overruling it), Pyett became one of the more contentious labor and em-
ployment decisions in the past several terms of the Supreme Court.
The more controversial implications of Pyett may catalyze and revi-
talize a plethora of legislative initiatives, 189 such as the Arbitration Fair-
ness Act of 2009,190 from their recent languishing dormancy. Much of
189 See Michael J. Lockerby, 'Fairness' Looms in New Congress, NAT'L L. J., November
24, 2008, at 13-17 (surveying pending legislation).
190 H.R. 1020, 111 th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
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the reform legislation is, despite benign titles, in fact hostile to labor and
employment arbitration. Pyett may add fuel in the short term to those
pernicious populist legislative fires. The Arbitration Fairness Act, for
example, would render unenforceable any and all agreements to arbitrate
entered into before a dispute arose, a gross overreaction to the proven
efficacy and fairness of labor and employment arbitration. 191 In addi-
tion, the proposed Act would amend the FAA so as to invalidate all
mandatory predispute agreements to arbitrate all employment, consumer,
franchise, and civil rights disputes.192 The Act further provides that the
determination of the validity and enforceability of an agreement to arbi-
trate shall be determined by courts with reference to federal law, and not
by arbitrators.
193
Pyett's seeming initial attractiveness to some employer and union
institutional interests is presumably genuine. A single labor arbitration
resolving all labor contract and statutory claims, with subsequent litiga-
tion of the statutory claims foreclosed, presents the great advantage of
the unitary omnibus process. Pyett offers unions and employers the al-
ternative of one, rather than at least two serial, bite(s) at the proverbial
apple.
Pyett is a significant alternative to Gardner-Denver; but it is Pyett
that is the innovative, intriguing exception, while Gardner-Denver re-
mains the default, the norm, and, quite likely, the prevailing dynamic for
the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, it is not a zero-sum war between
Gardner-Denver and Pyett. The latter is an interesting alternative that
merits the careful consideration of employers, employees, and unions,
especially by those dissatisfied with the serial proceedings and seemingly
never-ending litigation virtually guaranteed by Gardner-Denver.
191 See Lockerby, supra note 189, at 13-17.
192 See id. at 15.
193 See id.
